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Abstract
The theme of the 18th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites questions whether small satellites are a
complimentary or a disruptive technology. This paper addresses this question by performing an analysis of the role
small satellites play in the space market. The market is segmented into three primary components, military space,
civil space, and commercial space. Analysis focuses on the U.S. space market. The analysis shows that while small
satellites perform some valuable missions, they represent only a small part of the overall space market. Furthermore, although there are some upcoming opportunities for small satellites, they do not appear to be poised for substantial growth in any of the markets. Interestingly, an ORBCOMM case study suggests that high launch costs are
not a major obstacle to growth in the commercial space market since they represent just 10% of the total investment
required. Overall, the study finds that small satellites are unlikely to be able to perform the roles played by large
satellites, so any transition of small satellites from a complimentary to a disruptive technology must come through
new applications that open up new markets.
The figure suggests an answer to the central question of
this year’s conference: Are small satellites a complimentary or a disruptive technology. When making such
an evaluation, one must carefully separate the issue of
small satellite utility from the question of the market
impact. Seventeen previous Conferences on Small Satellites have provided ample evidence of the capabilities
of small satellites. From the ORBCOMM microsatellite constellation that helped save the lives of two sailors hundreds of miles off the coast of Australia to the
Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL)-sponsored
Disaster Monitoring Constellation that has the potential
to save thousands more, small satellites have made important societal contributions. However, small satellites
can achieve great things in targeted arenas without acting as a disruptive technology to the space market as a
whole.

INTRODUCTION
Proponents have long suggested that small satellites
will transform the use of space. The advent of small
satellites is often likened to the introduction of the personal computer. While PCs have become ubiquitous,
small spacecraft have failed to generate broad interest.
In 1980, 300,000 desktop computers were sold.1 This
figure has jumped more than 400 times to 130 million
worldwide computers sold annually.2 By 2002, more
than one billion PCs have been produced.3 As Figure 1
shows, small satellite launches have shown no secular
growth over the last 15 years, except for a bulge in the
period from 1998 to 2000. The launches of 25
ORBCOMM spacecraft in 1998-1999 and 6 CubeSatclass spacecraft in 2000 largely account for the departure from the historical norm of about 13 launches per
year.
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To answer this question, the space market is broken into
three segments, military, civil, and commercial, with a
focus on the U.S. market. In each case, qualitative metrics are used to assess the portion of the market being
addressed by small satellites and the potential for small
satellite activity to grow within that market. Fundamentally, growth can come from one of three methods:
displacement of larger satellites, maintenance of existing market share within a growing space market, or
creation of new markets. It is important to note that
displacement of larger satellites does not necessarily
mean that small satellites must perform the same func-
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Figure 1: Small Satellite Launch History4
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tions as large satellites, particularly in the government
space market. Rather, small satellites may provide a
capability deemed higher priority than that of a large
satellite, and therefore receive funding instead of the
large satellite.

nuclear detonations. A small satellite-sized payload to
satisfy this mission simply cannot be built using current
technology. Furthermore, the payload cannot be built
in multiple constituent parts flown on multiple small
platforms.

The growth potential by each of these means is considered for each market.

Many of the defense satellite programs provide military
communications. As the military shifts to a networkcentric warfare philosophy, and as systems have become increasingly complex, military communications
bandwidth requirements have grown steadily and are
predicted to do so for the foreseeable future. To this
end, the military-owned satellites only tell part of the
picture. The military has become increasingly dependent upon commercial providers. As with the GPS satellites, the high powers required by the platforms make
small satellites ill-suited to this mission.

MILITARY SPACE
Unclassified military space spending is dominated by
several large programs (see Table 1). Each of these
programs uses large satellites; masses are provided for
several of the existing spacecraft. Most are in geosynchronous or highly elliptical orbits, which drives the
need for large launch vehicles or large on-board propulsion systems. Correspondingly, these programs can be
extremely expensive. For instance, the Space-Based
Radar program is estimated to cost nearly $30 billion.5

A simple analysis of the challenges facing reconnaissance satellites suggests that small satellites are a difficult match with this application. Fundamentally,
reconnaissance satellites are attempting to collect energy over an enormous range of frequencies with high
resolution, excellent sensitivity, and continuous global
coverage.

Small satellites face substantial hurdles when trying to
perform these missions. For example, GPS satellites
must transmit jam-resistant signals on multiple frequencies. Fitting all of these high power transmitters on a
single platform requires a large satellite. In principal, a
cluster of small satellites could be used, with one signal
hosted by each vehicle. However, this would degrade
system performance due to minute differences between
the clocks on each platform. Furthermore, the system
would be much more expensive to operate due to the
increased number of spacecraft and clocks to be coordinated. This problem is particularly acute for clock
management.

Even large spacecraft must make compromises among
these objectives. However, these systems typically
require large receiver apertures to gain sensitivity and
resolution, and enormous data throughput to maximize
coverage. Such requirements have precluded the use of
small satellites. Studies have been performed that investigate the possibility of using distributed apertures
for a variety of military and civilian space applications,
but the technology is still too immature to support use
on an operational mission.

The Space-Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High)
illustrates a second problem. The satellites are designed to provide early warning of missile launches and

Small satellites have been used by the military for ex-

Table 1: Major Military Space Programs as of 2001
Program

Lead
Org.
DSP
Air Force
DMSP
Air Force
MilSatCom EHF
Air Force
MilSatCom Polar Air Force
T-SAT
Air Force
GPS
Air Force
NPOESS
Air Force
SBIRS-High
Air Force
Space-Based Radar Air Force
Wideband Gapfiller Air Force
DSCS
Army
MUOS
Navy
Sat Comm Systems Navy

Purpose
Nuclear and missile warning
Weather monitoring and prediction; to be replaced by NPOESS
Communications
Communications
Communications
Precise position, velocity, and time transfer
Weather monitoring and prediction; co-sponsored by NOAA and NASA
Nuclear and missile warning; replacement for DSP
Moving target tracking; radar mapping
Communications; successor to DSCS
Communications
Communications
Communications

Mass
(kg)
2400
1500
~7000
1545
~2000
6000
1235
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periments and technology demonstration. For example,
the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) is developing TacSat-1, a small imaging satellite that will be
tasked by commanders in the field. The Air Force’s
Space Test Program has sponsored several small satellites, the latest of which is the technology-demonstrator
STPSat-1. However, this spending represents only a
tiny fraction of the amount expended on operational
space systems.
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One bright spot for small spacecraft is an increased
interest in space situational awareness and space control. Small satellites are ideally suited to many missions in this arena. For example, small spacecraft make
excellent inspectors. These vehicles can be used to
study friendly satellites to aid with anomaly resolution
or damage inspection. The Air Force’s XSS-10 and
XSS-11 programs are demonstrating these capabilities,
as is the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous
Technology (DART) mission. SSTL’s 6.5 kg SNAP-1
nanosatellite demonstrated the ability of even very
small spacecraft to perform these functions. In addition, small spacecraft could also be used for offensive
or defensive purposes.
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Figure 2: Military Space Budget Authority (constant 2005 dollars)6,7
NASA
The same fundamental analysis approach can be applied to small spacecraft for NASA. To date, NASA
has spent relatively little of its budget on small spacecraft. Although NASA has a large annual budget of
$15.4 billion, small satellites can only address a portion
of this market. Table 2 lists the breakdown of NASA’s
2004 budget.

One sign of the DoD’s commitment to small spacecraft
is its investment in lower cost access to space. OFT
purchased the inaugural launch of the SpaceX Falcon-1
launch vehicle for the TacSat-1 mission. In addition,
DARPA initiated the FALCON program (separate from
the SpaceX Falcon-1 launch vehicle) intended to lower
both the cost and the time required to get small payloads on orbit. This so-called operational space launch
capability could enable a host of new opportunities for
small spacecraft.

Only $450 million of the $7.5 billion in the Space
Flight Capabilities line item can be addressed by small
spacecraft. Within the $7.85 billion Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration budget, $2 billion is spent on biological and aeronautical research. Nonetheless, this
leaves more than $6 billion. This money covers far
more than just spacecraft—it includes all phases and
elements of program and technology development including launch vehicle expenses and science investigations.

Although these new opportunities have enormous potential value to the military, they are unlikely to cause a
major displacement of existing military space programs
or to justify a significant increase in space spending
relative to other DoD expenditures, at least in the nearto medium term.

A review of the missions in these categories highlights
the difficulties small satellites face in NASA missions.
These challenges are very similar to those encountered
in military space missions. Within Space Science, the
Solar System Exploration and Mars Exploration categories send interplanetary probes to various solar system
destinations. Since these trajectories require high velocities, and therefore large launch vehicles, small satellites do not provide a cost effective option since the
launch cost will be high regardless of the spacecraft
size. Furthermore, the investigations frequently rely
upon having multiple simultaneous, co-located measurements. The Astronomical Search for Origins relies
upon both ground and space assets. This includes the
large and very expensive Hubble and James Webb
Space Telescopes. Since the science goals involve
peering as deep as possible into the history of the universe, extremely sensitive instruments are required that
frequently involve large apertures. In many cases, the

If small spacecraft cannot further penetrate the existing
military market or create major new opportunities, the
alternative is to maintain market share in a growth market. Figure 2 shows real (inflation-adjusted) DoD
space-related expenditures. This includes not just satellites, but also ground systems, launch vehicles, systems
engineering, management, and research and development. The figure shows a large build-up during the
Reagan administration followed by net declines in the
Bush and Clinton administrations. Although space
spending is on the rebound, it is clear that the near-term
growth rate is not sufficient to support a revolutionary
role for small spacecraft in the military arena.
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Table 2: 2004 NASA Budget6
The trend for small spacecraft at NASA has been neutral, at best. ST-5 and THEMIS are the only active
programs using spacecraft weighing less than 100 kg.
If it proceeds, the Magnetosphere Constellation would
represent a major step forward. If the definition of
small spacecraft is expended to include full Pegasusclass spacecraft, NASA recently launched the SORCE
and GALEX spacecraft in 2003. These missions were
part of the Small Explorers (SMEX) program. The next
SMEX mission, AIM, is scheduled for launch in 2006.
However, the University Explorers (UNEX) program
was cancelled after approving just two missions. Also,
NASA recently delayed by at least a year the Announcement of Opportunity for the Medium-class Explorers (MIDEX). Although these typically involve
larger spacecraft, the last MIDEX award included the
THEMIS mission.

Budget Line Item

Budget
(US$m)
Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration
7,853
Space Science
3,994
Solar System Exploration
1,302
Mars Exploration
596
Astronomical Search for Origins
914
Structure and Evolution of the Universe
456
Sun-Earth Connection
726
Earth Science
1,606
Earth System Science
1,513
Earth Science Applications
92
Biological and Physical Research
986
Biological Sciences Research
368
Physical Sciences Research
357
Research Partnerships & Flight Support
260
Aeronautics
1,037
Space Flight Capabilities
7,498
Space Flight
5,890
Space Station
1,494
Space Shuttle
3,928
Space and Flight Support
468
Crosscutting Technology
1,608
Space Launch Initiative
938
Mission and Science Measurement
452
Innovative Tech. Transfer Partnerships
218
Inspector General
27
TOTAL
15,378

If small spacecraft cannot significantly grow their share
of the existing NASA market, the alternative is growth
of the overall NASA budget, or identification of new
applications that would displace NASA spending in
other areas such as manned space flight. At present, no
such missions are in formulation at NASA. Furthermore, as Figure 3 shows, the overall NASA budget
trend has trended downward. Real spending at NASA
has been declining for more than a decade. In January
2004, President Bush introduced an Exploration Initiative that would take humans back to the Moon and on
to Mars. The initiative included a proposed modest
increase in NASA funding, although Congress has
given the concept a cool reception. Even if NASA’s
budget did grow modestly as proposed, the Exploration
Initiative would increase emphasis on manned space
activities that would likely decrease total spending on
robotic missions of all sizes.

instruments alone weigh much more than a small spacecraft.
The Structure and Evolution of the Universe also requires very sensitive instruments, although the mission
set shows that these spacecraft are somewhat smaller
than those of the Astronomical Search for Origins.
However, these spacecraft cannot be classified as especially small. The Sun-Earth Connection studies variability of the Sun and its effect on the Earth. This
includes ionospheric and magnetospheric studies that
can be addressed by small spacecraft. This theme includes the THEMIS mission that uses five 100 kg
spacecraft to study the magnetosphere. NASA is also
studying a mission with up to 100 micro-spacecraft also
targeting magnetospheric research called the Magnetosphere Constellation.
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The Earth System Science theme also has made very
limited use of small spacecraft. As with other areas, the
primary challenges are the demands of sensitive instruments performing ground-breaking science and the
need to make multiple simultaneous measurements
from a common platform.
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Figure 3: NASA Budget History
(constant 2005 dollars)9,10

4
Lewin

18th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites

example with which to test this theory. Although
launch costs are not publicly available, educated
guesses can be made regarding the ORBCOMM launch
costs. Table 3 lists the ORBCOMM launches and the
estimated prices. As the table shows, ORBCOMM
orbited 35 spacecraft in six launches with a total estimated cost of $72 million. However, this represents
just 9% of the total investment in ORBCOMM, which
exceeded $800 million at the time of its bankruptcy. 12
Even assuming a 20% error in the launch cost estimate,
the launch cost would be 7 – 11% of the total investment.

COMMERCIAL
The final venue for small satellite activity is the commercial market. This market is dominated by geosynchronous communications satellites providing a variety
of services. Small satellites are ill-suited to these missions. First, most geosynchronous spacecraft are
launched into a parking orbit known as geosynchronous
transfer orbit (GTO). GTO has a low perigee (200 –
500km) and an apogee at the geosynchronous altitude.
The satellites then boost themselves to a circular geosynchronous orbit (GEO). The energy required to accomplish this maneuver is very large. Consequently,
even a “small” GEO spacecraft has a launch mass of
over 1000 kg. This problem can be mitigated by using
a launch vehicle that places the spacecraft directly in
GEO. However, the same “small” GEO spacecraft
have a 1.5 kW – 4.5 kW payload power requirement.11
This amount of payload power cannot be accommodated by small spacecraft. While a cluster of multiple
smaller spacecraft could theoretically perform the same
task, this approach suffers from many of the same limitations discussed relative to GPS satellites.

Table 3: Estimated ORBCOMM Launch Costs
(real-year dollars)
S/C
Launch Vehicle
FM1-2
Pegasus (w/ MicroLab-1)
FM5-12 Pegasus
FM3-4
Taurus (secondary)
FM13-20 Pegasus
FM21-28 Pegasus
FM30-36 Pegasus
35 spacecraft, 6 launches

Low Earth orbiting (LEO) communications constellations represent a much smaller part of the commercial
landscape. The most prominent examples are Iridium
and Globalstar. Although the underlying architectures
are quite different, both companies use moderate size
spacecraft—about 700kg and 450kg, respectively. The
spacecraft size is again dominated by the required
transmitter power. Small satellites have had some success in this environment. ORBCOMM operates a constellation of 35 micro-spacecraft that provide low rate
two-way messaging and data services. Nonetheless,
LEO communications has proven to be a very difficult
market to establish. Each of the systems mentioned
entered bankruptcies that have cost investors billions of
dollars. After writing off their initial investments for
pennies on the dollar, these companies are recovering,
however, and are beginning to consider building replacement systems.

Year Est. Cost
1995
$10m
1997
$14m
1998
$5m
1998
$14m
1998
$14m
1999
$15m
$72m

When evaluating a new concept, venture capitalists
typically look for a rate of return of at least 30%. Since
launch vehicles represent only about 10% of the total
project investment, they will not have a significant impact on the viability of a proposed project. Even if the
launch costs were zero, they would at best transform a
marginal concept into a viable one.
This result may seem surprising, but it is supported by
additional circumstantial evidence. Surrey Satellite
Technology Limited has for many years offered lowcost spacecraft solutions. In 1996, Surrey quoted micro-satellite (10 – 100kg) costs from $2 - $3 million,
and mini-satellite (100kg – 500kg) costs from $5 - $20
million.13 Even allowing for inflation, these represent
very modest cost numbers. Using secondary rides and
Russian launch vehicles such as the SS-18 Dnepr, Surrey has been able to offer very low-cost turnkey solutions, as evidenced by the recent deployment of their
Disaster Monitoring Constellation. Yet, this capability
has not translated into substantial market activity.
SSTL has launched just 12 spacecraft since 1996.

If small satellites are not able to replace existing commercial systems, then the alternative is to create new
markets. The communications market provides a sobering example. At one point, at least three such LEO
constellations were proposed. However, ORBCOMM
was the only system built, and its survival is due only to
its aforementioned bankruptcy.

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
The one growth “market” for small satellites is educational institutions. Twenty years ago, almost no educational institutions were involved in satellite
development. Today, universities around the world are
working on small satellites. For example, the CubeSat
web site lists 66 universities and four high schools from

It has widely been argued that high launch costs have
been a key roadblock to broader use of micro-satellites.
Indeed, the theme of the 17th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites proclaimed that “getting
there is half the battle.” ORBCOMM provides a useful

5
Lewin

18th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites

16 countries representing every (populated) continent.14
Other universities have gained small satellite experience through the U.S. Air Force Nanosatellite-2 and
Nanosatellite-3 effort. Finally, NASA’s UNEX program offered universities an opportunity to implement
low-cost missions.

will not see the high long-term growth rates that are
possible in commercial markets.
Thus, one must conclude that small satellites at present
are a complementary technology fulfilling a set of niche
applications in the government and commercial space
marketplace. This does not diminish the utility or criticality of small satellites; it merely characterizes their
role in the overall space marketplace.

Unlike the commercial market, the lack of low-cost
launches has been a significant problem for university
satellites. Launch cost and availability were major factors in the cancellation of the UNEX program and in the
failure to launch the hardware produced under the University Nanosatellite-2 program. To date, a single
CubeSat launch has taken place, releasing six CubeSatclass spacecraft. Another CubeSat launch is planned
for late 2004 that could involve up to 15 such satellites
from 12 institutions. However, this still represents only
a fraction of the educational institutions interested in
CubeSat development.

Looking ahead, small satellites are being considered for
broader use in each of the market areas considered, but
this growth is small relative to the overall market.
Therefore, barring the introduction of a revolutionary
small satellite application, small satellites will remain a
complementary technology for the foreseeable future.
ACRONYMS
AIM
DARPA

Aeronomy of Ice in the Mesosphere
Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency
DART
Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous
Technology
DMSP
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
DoD
Department of Defense
DSCS
Defense Satellite Communications System
DSP
Defense Support Program
EHF
Extremely High Frequency
FALCON Force Application and Launch from Continental United States
FY
Fiscal Year
GALEX Galaxy Explorer
GEO
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit
GPS
Global Positioning System
GTO
Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit
LEO
Low Earth Orbit
MIDEX Medium Explorers
MUOS
Multi-User Objective System
NASA
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NPOESS National Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite System
OFT
Office of Force Transformation
PC
Personal Computer
SBIRS
Space-Based Infrared System
SMEX
Small Explorers
SNAP
Surrey Nanosatellite Applications Platform
SORCE Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment
SSTL
Surrey Satellite Technology, Limited
ST
Space Technology
THEMIS Time History of Events and Macroscale
Interactions during Substorms
T-SAT
Transformational Satellite
UNEX
University Explorers
XSS
Experimental Satellite system

For educational institutions, small satellites are unquestionably a disruptive technology in the most positive
sense. They have enabled universities to provide
hands-on experience to thousands of students who
would not have had such opportunities in the past.
However, this is a change to the education market
rather than one to the space market. While universities
comprise a strong and vibrant component of the small
satellite community, their efforts are primarily aimed at
educating students and performing some technology
development, not at identifying and exploiting the market potential for these spacecraft.
CONCLUSIONS
The failure of small satellites to generate new commercial markets is especially critical when evaluating the
impact of small spacecraft on the space marketplace.
Truly disruptive technologies typically gain acceptance
and growth by enabling new capabilities and applications rather than by simply replacing existing technologies. The personal computer analogy is a perfect
example. Although PCs replaced some mainframes, the
main engine of growth for the PC was the new applications that it brought to the user. For the first time, personnel throughout an organization could have access to
powerful word processing and spreadsheet tools. These
same capabilities also drove a burgeoning home PC
market. The displacement of mainframe computers was
largely a secondary effect driven by the rapidly expanding capability of the PC.
Small satellites face a number of hurdles that make it
very unlikely that they could replace the large satellites
performing government military and scientific satellite
missions. Furthermore, government space spending
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